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Abstract—Insufficient resource allocation causes an Internet
information security (infosec) problem that public policy could
improve. Lack of transparency lets organizations avoid ad-
dressing internal risks, leaving vulnerabilities that are exploited
by botnets, threatening information security of other Internet
participants. Their protection provides no economic benefit to
the firm, so this negative externality causes underinvestment
in infosec. Public policy could provide a partial solution by
adding incentives for organizations to have well-configured in-
fosec. Specifically, mandatory reporting of security issues plus
presenting this information to the public, can impose shame
and fame on organizations through publicity and peer influence
by comparison with major competitors. Outbound spam is a
prominent symptom of poor infosec that this project uses as
a proxy for overall security, mapping anti-spam blocklist IP
addresses to organizations [1]. Selected top outbound spam
rankings publicized through SpamRankings.net have already
produced positive pilot test results. Next we use field experiments
to test the effects of information disclosure and the relative
effectiveness of different information presentations.
As the first of two objectives, we determine whether public
ranking of spam can be an effective mechanism for encouraging
firms to reduce outbound spam. Second, we explore the most
effective ways of presenting information to the public to improve
infosec. Our study serves as an assessment for the public policy
of mandatory information disclosure. We use field experiments
to aggregate company information within and between industries
and analyze the results of presenting such information to the pub-
lic. Field experiments have been used extensively in the analysis
of public policy programs [2] [3]. The experiments include design
of an information system for public information disclosure and
presentation to get public attention, to observe reactions, and
to analyze the underlying mechanisms. This information system
design can be extended to other problems to provide incentives
for the decision makers of externality problems, such as pollution,
energy saving, etc. A public information system enables inferring
internal infosec based on observed outcome, and thus makes such
information transparent and induces reputation for the decision
makers: shame for producing negative externalities or fame for
fixing or preventing them. Reputation internalizes externalities,
encouraging decision makers to take socially optimal behavior.
Because of the positive pilot test results, we propose conducting
a full-scale randomized controlled trial based on the Spam-
Rankings.net initiative. The purpose of a randomized controlled
trial is to experimentally create individual research groups that
are generally similar except that the groups receive different
experimental treatments. So any differences that arise between
the research groups subsequent to the treatments are due to
the respective treatment. Randomized experiments thus avoid
selection bias, producing high internal validity.
For two full-scale experiments, we will identify a sample of
companies by geographic units for which we have outgoing spam
data, and randomly assign the companies by geographic unit to
different groups. In the first experiment, we will randomly assign
the companies to one of two groups: a treatment group whose
spam statistics will be widely publicized and a control group
without publicizing any spam information. This initial evaluation
can examine whether the proposed policy can induce firms to
reduce spam. Assuming success of the first experiment, the second
will explore the most effective policy intervention, by randomly
assigning company groups to different information presentations
including absolute spam volume, ranking per country, and
ranking per industry, to see what granularity of peer comparison
has the most effect.
This is the first publication of the details and the behavioral
economics context of these experiments. Supported by NSF grant
no. 0831338; the usual disclaimers apply.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although various technical tools are available, the funda-
mental problem with improving Internet security is the lack
of incentives to adopt these tools while containing their costs.
Good information security (infosec) is not just techniques: it
is also procedures and processes. 90 percent of cyber attacks
could be avoided with “good hygiene,” [4]. The problem is that
as long as ESPs act individually and think no one can see their
infosec, they have no incentive to implement the techniques
or organize them with procedures and processes.
This paper describes field experiments using Internet op-
erational data to study new economic and policy incentives
for electronic mail service providers (ESPs) and other Internet
participants to take responsibility and act collectively to im-
prove Internet security. These experiments may justify policies
for other infosec reporting, for further infosec improvement.
Towards the goal of improved security we use a proxy:
outbound spam (bulk unsolicited email), [5]. Spam is a sneeze
for infosec disease, because spam is typically sent via botnets
or other malware that infests organizations due to poor infosec.
The purpose of the project is to use available information
on the quantity of spam emitted by individual organizations to
encourage these organizations to adopt stronger infosec mea-
sures by publicizing the data. Economic theory predicts that by
publicizing such information firms will come under pressure
to change their policies through several mechanisms, such as
peer pressure, more information about the magnitude of the
problems existing in their networks, or the threat of customers
switching to competitors with better security. We intend to test
whether or not a program that simply publicizes the existing
information (despite the limitations of this information) on the
quantity of spam released by the companies can cause them to
change their behavior. More generally, we aim to demonstrate
the feasibility of using randomized controlled trials to explore
organizational infosec decision processes.
Just as other diseases might not cause sneezes, organizations
that react to these new incentives and fix their spam problem
might still have other security problems. Organizations could
use the same sorts of technology they already use to filter
inbound spam [6] to filter outbound spam. Nothing we propose
is a panacea for all infosec problems. However, preliminary
experiments thus far indicate that ranked organizations do
prefer to try to fix their underlying infosec problems. We will
study how much this is true as part of the project.
Many organizations consider outbound spam to be some-
body else’s problem and thus ignore it, minimizing infosec ex-
penditure in favor of profits [7], [8], [9]. The same unaddressed
vulnerabilities that let spammers in are often exploited to
threaten the security and interests of other Internet participants,
whose protection provides no economic benefit to the firm.
This creates what economists refer to as a negative externality,
resulting in underinvestment in infosec.
Public policy could provide a partial solution to this ex-
ternality by providing additional incentives for organizations
to have well-configured infosec. Specifically, mandatory re-
porting of security issues plus presenting this information in a
relative way (as rankings) to the public, can impose shame and
fame on organizations through publicity and peer influence by
comparison with major competitors.
We have obtained spam data for the entire Internet from
blocklists (lists of IP addresses known to send spam). Later
we will add experiments using phishing data. Decreasing spam
or phishing for treated organizations are merely steps towards
or byproducts of the actual goal, which is ongoing infosec
improvement through improved incentives.
Reputational incentives through rankings such as in Spam-
Rankings.net can provide transparency that enables ESPs to
see what infosec works and for competitors and customers to
see that an ESP’s infosec is working. Such improved infosec
resource allocation may be tied to marketing and sales through
the effects shown in rankings. Organizational infosec may thus
convert from a cost center to a profit center by retaining or
attracting customers. With measurement, an enterprise can take
more control over its use of the Internet [10], [11], [12].
The project team daily collects data on outbound spam
volume observed for IP addresses and maps these IP addresses
to Autonomous Systems (ASes) and soon also to their owning
organizations. The core of the project is a field experiment
to test the impact of information disclosure on outbound
spam and the relative effectiveness of different information
presentations including absolute volume and relative rankings.
As pilot tests, selected top outbound spam rankings pub-
lished through SpamRankings.net have already produced ten-
tative positive results with medical and other organizations.
II. METHODS
A standard full-scale randomized controlled trial (RCT)
normally requires on the order of 2,000 units to randomize for
optimal power of experimental results. Such numbers of units
are difficult for rankings such as those in SpamRankings.net,
because there are fewer than 2,000 countries in the world.
Nonetheless, we have an opportunity to apply RCT in some
form to data that may never have been studied in that way;
data that cover the whole world every day. Such an attractive
opportunity may require some modifications of approaches
used for other data.
A. Geographical scope and unit size
Using smaller geographical units than countries would
seem likely to produce more units for randomization, but
the smaller the geographic unit, the less spam. Units down
to the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or city level
might seem convenient. (See also §II-G4 Ranking levels about
organizational, ASN, or netblock levels.) For example, medical
organizations in Atlanta, Boston, and Shanghai. However, a
rather solid preliminary observation is that we never see spam
from most ASNs in the world. Specifically, we usually do
not observe more than a dozen or so spamming medical
organizations worldwide, so there is no reason to expect
that individual cities will have enough such organizations for
randomization per city to work.
The issue is not precision or accuracy or difficulty of
assigning geographic locations for the ASNs. The issue is that
because most ASNs do not spam, the smaller the geographical
area, the less spam can be expected to be seen from it.
For a few large organizational types, such as ISPs or hosting
companies, there may be enough ASNs and spam for more
local geographical areas to work, and we will explore that
possibility. However, for our main initial experiments we focus
on countries as the basic geographical unit.
Randomizing selection of ASNs within a country to publi-
cize would produce published lists of ASNs that weren’t really
rankings, since some ASNs that would have enough observed
spam volume to appear would be in the control group and
would not be published. So it is more feasible to use countries
as a whole as the unit of randomization. Fortunately, statistical
techniques have been developed to deal with clustered data.
B. Clustered RCT
Clustered randomized controlled trials are increasingly pop-
ular in medical studies [13]. In cluster assignment of samples
into different groups, the essential sample size becomes the
number of clusters instead of the number of individuals.
However, medical studies do not typically require thousands of
groups to cluster. One medical study of heart failure manage-
ment involved 197 individuals (56 in the intervention group
and 95 in the control group) [14]. The Consolidated Standards
of Reporting Trials (CONSORT) have been extended to add a
few points for clustered randomized trials [15].
Clustered RCTs have been used outside hospitals in the
field, such as in a recent study of immunization of children
in India [16] that is somewhat analogous to our experiments.
The individual participants in that study were 1640 children in
134 villages, and the villages were the units of randomization.
1640 is far less than the number of ASNs for which we have
data. 134 is less than the 200+ countries for which we have
data, and in the same range as the number of countries for
which we have many ASNs.
One reason for the popularity of medical clustered RCTs
is that medical subjects naturally cluster (in wards, or by
treatments other than those being studied, etc.), and it is
important to take such clustering into account in statistical
analysis [13]:
Members of a cluster will be more like one another
than they are like members of other clusters and we
need to take this into account in the analysis, and
preferably the design, of the study. Methods which
ignore clustering may mislead, because they assume
that all subjects provide independent observations.
Similarly, organizations on the Internet do cluster in coun-
tries, so our analysis will take that fact into account. Mean-
while, we have huge advantages that medical trials mostly do
not: ongoing daily data and worldwide coverage. A relatively
small clustered RCT will serve as a starting point. If results
are positive, they will motivate more extensive experiments.
C. Selection and description of sample
In our study, the organizations are clustered by countries.
The outcome evaluations are based on comparing organi-
zations in the treatment countries to organizations in other
similar countries. For the purpose of this study, organizations
within one country need to be ranked together. So we could
not do treatment selection at the organization level. Therefore,
we nest ASNs within countries and assign countries as clusters
to the treatment condition. While clustered assignment is more
practical and has been extensively used by existing studies, its
disadvantage is that the effective sample size becomes much
smaller: it is the number of clusters rather than individuals.
1) Correlation within country: Because outbound spam
may be correlated within country as a result of common
policies and regulations, failure to correct the standard errors
could result in an overestimate of the treatment effects [17]
[18]. We therefore need to cluster the standard errors at
the country level (the level of treatment assignment) in all
of the above models. Cluster-robust standard errors permit
heteroskedasticity and within-cluster error correlation, but can
still over-reject with few (five to thirty) clusters [19]. So with
few countries in the data, we need to further bootstrap the
strand errors to derive more precise estimation. Cameron et al.
(2008) showed that wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure performs
better than other bootstrap procedures (including pairs cluster
bootstrap-t, residual cluster bootstrap-t, and all bootstrap-se
methods) when the number of clusters is small.
There is reason to suspect correlation of outbound spam
within countries could be limited, similarly to what Banerjee
and Duflo noted about economic growth [20]:
The key fact is the enormous heterogeneity of rates
of return to the same factor within a single econ-
omy, a heterogeneity that dwarfs the cross-country
heterogeneity in the economy-wide average return.
It is well-known that national legal attempts to stop spam
or to improve infosec have had limited effect. See for example
the way snowshoe spam is spreading beyond the U.S. [21], or
how the recent takedown of the Grum botnet [22] (which itself
infested organizations in multiple countries) was followed
by an expansion of spam traffic from the Festi botnet that
pushed Saudi Arabia and Turkey into the top 10 spam-spewing
countries worldwide and made India number one [23].
2) Spam distribution by country and ASN: Our database
has collected during the period of publication of Spam-
Rankings.net daily outgoing spam data from the Composite
Blocking List (CBL) on 15,657 ASNs in 205 countries and
areas all over the world.
TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OF SPAMMING ASNS ACROSS COUNTRIES
Number of spamming ASNs Number of countries
>100 29
>50 17
>10 48
Subtotal 94
≤10 111
Total 205
The United States has the largest number (3,815) of ASNs,
followed by Russia (1,828) and Ukraine (836). Table I con-
tains statistics on the distribution of observed ASNs among
countries. We can see that the distribution is highly skewed
that over 80 percent of spamming ASNs are scattered within
29 countries, which is only a seventh of the countries.
TABLE II
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF OUTGOING SPAM
Month Mean Standard
deviation
Min Max Spamming
ASNs
2011/3 206724 2126080 0 99234107 10549
2011/4 166141 2028394 0 140284540 10126
2011/5 104488 1449672 0 131120382 9711
2011/6 121775 1645372 0 137096653 9782
2011/7 103156 1424145 0 97963663 9126
2011/8 95332 1351760 0 84812377 8994
2011/9 123115 1712561 0 92128338 8901
2011/10 108914 1543344 0 95194625 9003
2011/11 66179 934372 0 64111728 9304
2011/12 61714 776539 0 41208814 9376
2012/1 71010 929679 0 45787666 9033
2012/2 65372 750438 0 33701736 9478
2012/3 58193 667938 0 33881560 9573
2012/4 54276 702873 0 36967993 9320
2012/5 53450 782549 0 50504031 9451
2012/6 42640 662836 0 48523440 9165
2012/7 37563 766878 0 73802240 9221
The outgoing spam volume data show that the distribution
spam volume is also skewed that a small portion of ASNs sent
out most of the spam. Table II presents the summary statistics
of outgoing spam by ASN. It shows that the standard deviation
of outgoing spam volume among ASNs is over 10 times of the
average volume. We can also see a decreasing trend in average
outgoing spam volume over time since the beginning of this
project while the number of ASNs with positive outgoing spam
volume is relatively stable.
D. Interventions
Our treatments may be considered analogous to those used
in a recent immunization study of children in India [16], in
which the individual participants were 1640 children clustered
as follows:
Interventions 134 villages were randomised to one
of three groups: a once monthly reliable immu-
nisation camp (intervention A; 379 children from
30 villages); a once monthly reliable immunisation
camp with small incentives (raw lentils and metal
plates for completed immunisation; intervention B;
382 children from 30 villages), or control (no in-
tervention, 860 children in 74 villages). Surveys
were undertaken in randomly selected households at
baseline and about 18 months after the interventions
started (end point).
Similarly to the immunization study, we propose three
groups: just publish rankings; publish and aggressively publi-
cise and contact ranked organizations; and don’t publish about
the control group.
Indeed, all the Indian children were in the one Indian state
of Rajasthan, but all ASNs are on the same Internet.
E. Study and evaluation design
Using data underlying the published and unpublished rank-
ings, we regressed outgoing spam volume on its lag, and found
that the spam volume in last month explains about 85% of the
variation in spam volume. Variation between countries only
accounts for less than 2% of the total variation. A power
analysis was conducted using the design approach for a cluster
randomized trial in the software of Optimal Design. The results
show that in order to achieve a power of 80%, if we can get
at least 50 ASNs within each country, we need to have at
least 20 countries if we take into account the influence of last
period spam volume or 40 countries if not. If we can get at
least 100 ASNs within each country, we only need to have 12
countries if we take into account the influence of last period
spam volume or 28 countries if not. According to Table I, our
current sample set can support our basic experiment.
F. Methods of publicity
If we propose to select countries from throughout the
whole world, with a variety of geographies, legal regimes, and
languages, how do we propose to make the SpamRankings.net
website known in all those countries?
We do it using the Internet and through other means such
as technical organizations. For example, every ISP in the
European region is a member of RIPE and has technical
people going to RIPE conferences. Similarly for APNIC in
the Asia-Pacific region, LACNIC in Latin America and the
Caribbean, AfriNIC in Africa, and ARIN in North America
(which usually meets same time and place as NANOG, the
North American Operator’s Group). We have already presented
at one NANOG [24] and one RIPE [25] conference, as well
as at invited operational [26] and security [5] workshops, and
we will present at more. The Anti-Phishing Working Group
(APWG) draws technical, legal, and political people from the
entire world; one of us has presented at the eCrime conference
APWG co-organizes [27], [28]. Other relevant worldwide
organizations include Messaging Anti-Abuse Working Group
(MAAWG).
And it’s not just ISPs. Look at the medical organizations.
All of the high-ranking ones dropped to zero at the same time
because they all talk to each other [29]. Even the last chronic
holdout, WIN, finally fell out of the lead, even though it’s
based in Belgium and the rest are mostly in U.S., Canada,
and Korea [30].
The Internet is global, and technical security people in
every type of organization worldwide are part of the same
community. The common language of that community is
English. Certainly most Internet security participants probably
use their local languages day to day, but all of them have
access to English-reading and -speaking colleagues.
Their corporate executives may be somewhat more insular,
but the worldwide economy is also integrated, as is the global
press. In addition to trade blogs [31] and magazines [32], we
use global publications such as Network World [33], CACM
[34], Economist, Financial Times, etc. as often as we can get
covered.
Finally, the Internet itself will be a direct con-
duit to some types of treatment. We already pub-
lish frequent updates on the website and make notifi-
cations of them readily available through an RSS feed,
http://feeds.feedburner.com/Spamrankingsnet, plus a Word-
press widget, http://www.spamrankings.net/widget/. We will
be adding twitter, facebook, and YouTube postings.
It is also possible to use contact information found on the
websites of ranked organizations to inform them that they are
ranked, no matter where they are in the world.
G. Data sources
The most important point about our data sources is that this
is not a survey-based project. We get data every day about
ASNs in every country in the world that sends out significant
amounts of spam. The public SpamRankings.net uses no data
collected from the ranked companies themselves.
1) Spam as a sneeze for infosec disease: To conduct the
field experiment, we need data available now with which to
build reputational rankings. Fortunately, spam is a sneeze for
infosec disease, and anti-spam blocklists provide us copious
data on spam, with which we have already prototyped Spam-
Rankings.net. Outgoing spam is a proxy for Internet security
because it could be a symptom of far more damaging security
problems like malware, [5]. Spam is typically generated via
zombie computers, compromised user accounts, or spammers
who knowingly abuse their accounts. Spammers can steal
existing accounts by tricking end-users into providing their
email usernames and passwords. Computers infected with
malware often send spam as part of a botnet. If a computer
is under the control of a malicious third party, it could lead
to problems such as theft of customer records and intellectual
property, fraudulent use of corporate online banking, and even
employee blackmail.
Because bot herders will attack any computer that can
send email, spam can come from any Electronic Mail Service
Provider (ESP) on the Internet, not just Internet Service
Providers (ISPs), so blocklists provide us data on the entire
Internet. ESPs are constantly fighting against inbound spam,
phishing and email-borne malware. Internal costs of outbound
spam include IP blocking by RBL, DNSBL, and IP reputation
systems, causing queue buildup on the affected mail server, de-
lays in message delivery, and may result in lost messages and
calls from unhappy end-users. It also leads to compromised
user accounts and blocking of legitimate outbound email.
ESPs may not be aware that they are a source of malicious
emails. ESP users also do not know unless a serious attack
happens. Thus an ESP user sending spam not only risks being
attacked but also increases risks for other users. Eventually,
outbound spam could mean damaged reputation, customer dis-
satisfaction, increased operational costs, and loss of potential
profit.
2) Blocklists collected: Any infosec metric source will find
some problems and overlook some that other metrics might
find [35]. For this reason, we use multiple anti-spam blocklists.
SpamRankings.net derives its current rankings from two
blocklists: CBL (Composite Blocking List) and PSBL (Pas-
sive Spam Blocklist). (CBL is also the main component of
Spamhaus’ XBL.) In addition to their standard lists of IP
addresses, CBL and PSBL send us additional custom data:
volume information (numbers of spam messages seen from
each IP address). CBL also sends us for each address the latest
botnet (if any) they detected for that address.
CBL sends us data on millions of spam messages a day.
While this is only a fraction of daily spam Internet spam, it
is a large enough sample to compare organizations over time.
Each blocklist uses different spam traps and other sources,
each with its own biases. Each has its own methods of
determining which email messages to consider spam. Yet the
various blocklists do see quite similar views of large-scale
spam characteristics of the Internet, as we determined before
we started publishing rankings [36]. We continue to compare
CBL and PSBL results as we publish rankings.
We also collect daily data four other blocklists plus several
specialized sources, all available for further rankings.
3) Data aggregation: We aggregate blocklist information
per netblock and then per Autonomous System Number
(ASN), and soon per organization, taking account of overlaps
at each step so as not double-count volume. We also record
further custom data such as the botnet and other source type
information CBL sends us (snowshoe, darkmailer, etc.). We
manually add categorization attributes per organization, such
as Educational, Hosting, ISP, Medical, or Financial, plus finer
detail such as services offered.
We have performed statistical analyses at the IP address
level and at the ASN level regarding rapidity of detection,
growth of volume, recidivism, and the like, including per
category [37]. A large proportion of the technical infrastructure
hours spent on the project is dedicated to data integrity.
4) Ranking levels: The data lends itself to aggregation at
several Internet technical levels, most prominently netblock,
ASN, and owning organization. Other levels that could be
constructed might include states within countries, Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSAs), or cities: all of those more detailed
geographical levels would require adding more detailed geo-
graphical localization data, and would have the drawbacks of
diminishing amounts of spam discussed in §II-A Geographical
scope and unit size.
We are currently publishing rankings mainly at the ASN
level. However, we are exploring arguments for perhaps pub-
lishing rankings at the netblock level because for example
the constituent part of Microsoft’s AS 8075 that caused it to
appear many times at the top of one ranking [33], was mostly
a netblock for Hotmail.
Rankings by netblock would produce more units, and thus
make for easier and perhaps more robust statistics. However,
for many organizations there won’t be much difference per
netblock, but for larger ones there will be, especially big
corporations with many divisions.
Similarly, many organizations have only one ASN (and
some have none), but some organizations (especially those
that have formed by merging from previous organizations)
have many. Big ISPs and companies like google are examples.
Their acquisitions still use their old ASNs, and many of
the customers of those acquisitions may think of YouTube
or UUNET with identities separate from their new parent
companies.
In addition, ISPs often put cable or DSL rotary addresses on
their own netblocks, and those are used by different classes of
customers than the netblocks or ASNs supporting their VPN
services.
We could publicize rankings at all three levels (organization,
ASN, and netblock), but that would make it difficult to
disentangle the effects treatments at each level. We could let
some groups receive one level ranking and some another level.
We actually already publish rankings at three levels: Coun-
tries in the world, and ASNs per country, and ASNs in an
organizational category (medical) that crosses country bound-
aries.
The idea of the experiment is to get different groups
receiving different information so that we can validate our
theory and hypotheses through comparison results. Currently,
we have industry ranking and country ranking, which is used
in order to test if industry ranking can better incentivize
companies than country ranking so that we can support our
hypothesis of peer influence.
5) Data presentation: The current model for the public
SpamRankings.net is sports scores: tables with rows of rank,
team (ASN), and score (spam volume). In addition we provide
bar and pie charts of monthly data, plus a line graph of daily
data, in both linear and logarithmic form.
Each ranking is currently derived from a single blocklist
for ready comparison. We plan various forms of normalized
and derivative rankings. Perhaps most importantly, we plan to
add composite rankings that distill various other rankings into
summaries.
Perhaps the most important features of the public rankings
are the groupings of ASNs into rankings. Currently we are
publishing groupings mostly by country, with a few also by
organizational type (medical).
The experiments largely involve varying the degree of
publicity of the rankings. Rankings in the control group will
not be published (but will be visible internally to researchers).
One treatment group of rankings will be published much like
the ones currently visible on SpamRankings.net. A second
treatment group will be published and will also be actively
publicized through various means.
H. End points
Our data and treatments are somewhat different from the
usual relatively brief medical treatments with definite end
points. For example, the Indian immunization study was about
immunization of children with vaccines, and naturally came
to an end point once the vaccinating medical personnel had
finished their injection work [16]. Our data come in regularly
daily, and the treatments can continue as long as we like.
For SpamRankings.net itself, currently rankings are published
monthly, so one could consider every month’s publication of
a ranking as an end point.
I. Costs
Which infosec actually works best against which exploits
and attacks? As Dr. Dan Geer reminds us [38]:
Do you think our enemies will hesitate to spend
$1,000 to attack a target? Do you think they’ll
hesitate to spend $10,000? We don’t. We aren’t
smarter than the TSA. We can’t win this spending
game. So what’s the path out of these woods? We
don’t know, but we do know this: whatever it is,
it’ll involve us spending money on a smaller number
of things. An asymmetric enemy makes us spend a
dollar on every single thing that might happen while
he spends money on the one thing that will happen,
and that’s a mug’s game.
The current experiments may not address this question directly,
but they do make visible which organizations are not coping
sufficiently with at least one type of asymmetric enemy,
namely spammers, and, more importantly, with the underlying
vulnerabilities and exploits that make spamming possible and
also enable other possible exploits, such as identity theft,
blackmail, or DDoS. They also set the stage for examining
which infosec works best; see below under future experiments.
J. Drilldown
Simple observation that they are ranked can be enough for
many organizations to know what to do to get out of that
ranking. Others contact us for assistance.
Project researchers can use unpublished rankings in com-
parisons, as well as internal drilldown interfaces (some used
in this paper) to specific ASNs, netblocks, and botnets, with
adjustable timeframes [1]. For example, we can see which
botnets appear to be infesting a given ASN, and we can tell
which ASNs seem to be infested by a given botnet.
Other issues we are currently using drilldowns to investigate
include the snowshoe spam swelling this year and spreading
beyond its normal hosting center loci into ISPs and into
countries other than the U.S. [21], the recent Grum takedown
by FireEye [22], and the sudden surge of Festi spam around the
world, which has pushed India to the top of the world rankings
and put Saudi Arabia and Turkey in the top 10 spamming
countries [23].
In addition to the three technical levels of grouping already
discussed (organization, ASN, and netblock), there is also the
fourth level, of individual IP address. That level is important
along with the netblock level for drilldowns to satisfy inquiries
from ranked organizations. Publishing rankings on individual
IP addresses would probably not be very productive, since
there are so many of them, although for drilldowns we may
produce displays for individual IP addresses similar to those
for rankings.
For drilldowns it would be useful to find a way to make
a statistical connection between observed performance at the
ASN or netblock level and the individual IP address level [37].
III. DISCUSSION
A. Preliminary Results
Even before publishing SpamRankings.net, we determined
some preliminary results, including that most ESPs do not ever
send spam; some always do; size matters (the bigger the ESP,
the more likely it spams); and some do migrate between the
two groups. Partitions of providers already exist in the field:
national and state telecommunication companies are the worst,
sending much of total spam worldwide, [5].
1) Medical: When we started publishing SpamRank-
ings.net in May 2011, we included a pair of rankings (from
CBL and PSBL data) for medical organizations. Soon af-
terwards, they almost all dropped all together to zero spam
volume [39] from both blocklists. A technical contact at one
of the suddenly-improved hospitals told us they had found and
fixed their immediate problem, and:
“The listing on your site added additional impetus
to make sure we ”stay clean” so in that regard, you
are successful.”
He further indicated that all the big medical organizations
talked to each other all the time, and he indicated that
they might be adding some further infosec to ensure future
cleanliness. The same anonymous contact recently revealed
further detail to a Network World reporter [33].
A year into publishing SpamRankings.net, overall spam
from medical organizations remains low, and usually when
one of them gets ranked, it vanishes again next month [29].
The one recidivist holdout, WIN’s AS 9208, finally started
decreasing its volume in March 2012 and dropped out of the
July 2012 CBL top 10 ranking [30].
2) Microsoft: After Microsoft’s AS 8075 topped the U.S.
SpamRankings.net from PSBL for the fourth time, [40], we
sent inquiries to some Microsoft contacts, but heard nothing
back. After the fifth time, Network World wrote about it
[33]. That same day we were contacted by two people from
Microsoft. Examining the specific IP addresses observed by
PSBL as sending the spam, we noticed that about 3/4 of them
were associated with Hotmail. This is an example of how
publicity does get attention to the rankings. We are watching
to see whether AS 8075 drops in the rankings. So far, volume
is lower, but it may decrease further.
This ASN only topped the PSBL U.S. rankings; it never
appeared in the U.S. top 10 from CBL data. This example
illustrates that differing results from different data sources is
not a bug: it is a feature.
3) Takedowns: Takedowns and blocklists do temporarily
reduce spam from specific ESPs, as in the shutdown of Triple
Fiber Network [41] or FireEye’s takedown of the Ozdok botnet
[24]. However, such effects are indeed temporary; see below
under Drilldown. the Grum botnet [22].
4) Other: A statistical analysis (submitted for publication
elsewhere) of country rankings, comparing the publicly pre-
sented ones to other rankings internally visible to researchers,
indicates publication does affect organizational behavior.
B. Comparison with other studies
The Collaborative Center for Internet Epidemiology and
Defenses (CCIED) [42] does excellent work such as on new
methods of spam filtering [43]. Other organizations such as
Georgia Tech also study filtering methods [44]. Our project
does not study how specific infosec works, although we may
use results of such studies for infosec effectiveness experi-
ments.
Many interesting studies of spam and other malware used
logs or survey responses from affected organizations [45], [46].
Our data sources do not require cooperation of the ranked
organizations, providing some independence from deliberate
organizational bias.
Internet security professionals are starting to recognize that
security metrics are required to replace fear, uncertainty, and
doubt in the Internet, [47], but to date while metrics have been
deployed extensively within organizations, [48], the ignored
elephant in the room remains “the necessity of comparative
analytics” across organizations, [49].
Many previous studies were mostly limited to Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) [50], [51]. Since our sources are anti-
spam blocklists (and eventually also APWG’s phishing report
database), our rankings can cover every organization on the
Internet that spams or phishes.
C. Limitations of study
While our data set is as complete as possible, any data
source is going to be incomplete. The next question is how
the incompleteness of the data we receive will be handled
within the experiment. We already provide acknowledgment
of the sources of the information, and we do and will provide
descriptions of our processing of the data so that the limitations
of the data are acknowledged. The primary question our
experiment is designed to answer is is not whether or not the
information is noisy: all available information in this regard is
obviously noisy. Rather the question we ask is whether making
this information public – despite its limitations – can be an
effective tool to encourage companies to change their infosec.
Three points often come up in discussions of country-level
randomization. Here they are, with responses to each.
1) The units of randomization are very heterogeneous.
Yet, as we noted above in §II-E Study and evaluation
design, “Variation between countries only accounts for
less than 2% of the total variation.”
2) There are not very many of them.
Many clustered RCTs use fewer units than we have
available. As we noted above in §II-E Study and evalu-
ation design, we have enough country units to achieve
a power of 80%.
3) Our ability to collect information might vary signifi-
cantly by country.
This item usually results from a misunderstanding of
the nature of our data. We do not go out and collect
our data in surveys. We do not depend on cooperation
of the subject organizations to provide data. The subject
organizations send outbound spam, anti-spam blocklists
collect it, and some of those blocklists send us the
data we use. An organization cannot refuse to cooperate
with a survey, because there is no survey. The only
way an organization can refuse to cooperate is by not
sending outbound spam. That would indeed improve an
organization’s rankings, and would be a positive effect
of the rankings and of the experiments.
As we noted in II.C. Selection and description of sample,
we see significant events in countries such as Saudi
Arabia and Turkey in which we are relatively certain
none of the blocklists that send us data have spamtraps.
Actually, a huge advantage of the data used in this
project is that we can see every country in the world,
on a daily basis, in some detail, with metrics that are
comparable across countries.
We are continually trying various approaches, including
different geographic and other levels of ranking and random-
ization, and we always value input.
D. Policy implications
Our principal objective is to demonstrate that requiring firms
to report on their Internet security issues can enable solutions
for improved Internet security, especially when combined with
reputational rankings for visiblility of peer comparisons. A
mandatory reporting policy can induce positive reaction from
firms so that they would have improved security awareness,
vulnerability detection, and information protection.
We propose to leverage mechanisms including (but not
limited to): concerns for security breaches, sense of shame
or fame, and peer influence.
1) We hypothesize that that mandatory regular infosec
reporting could force firms to take closer look at their
security situation. We can test that hypothesis using
data that is already publicly available, namely outbound
spam, which does not need mandatory reporting, since
anti-spam blocklists already detect it. SpamRankings.net
correlates that data per organization, geography, cate-
gory, etc. to produce public rankings for peer pressure.
The policy implications can be applied to other security
issues, where mandatory reporting could make com-
parable data available. Simply having to report would
increase firms’ awareness their security vulnerabilities,
potentially costing reputation and profit through third
party exploits.
2) Publicizing their security issues can make firms feel
ashamed of their irresponsibility for others’ Internet
security. Shame is triggered by a choice made in public
that does not maximize the payoffs of others, [52]. [53]
argue that a person’s behavior may depend on whether it
is observed by someone who is directly affected by it. A
classic dictator game is where one person gets to anony-
mously divide some money (usually $10) between her-
self and another person, [54]. Many studies use a variant
of the dictator game, where the dictator can opt out the
game before the recipient learns it is being played. The
dictator can get a pre-specified amount of money if she
exits, and the recipient gets nothing. It turns out one
third of the participants choose to exit when offered
$9, [55]. If the dictator is completely altruistic, playing
the game and choosing $9 for herself and $1 for the
recipient would be a preferred choice. If the dictator
is completely selfish, playing the game and allocating
all $10 to herself would be preferred. Therefore, [53]
develop the concept of moral cost (shame) that enters
the utility function additively to justify such behavior.
The effect of observation on the agent’s behavior can
be extended to organizations because organizations are
concerned about their social image and performance,
[56]. Conversely, every ISP thinks it is the best in the
world at what it does. Rankings based on real data could
provide some of them (and other ESPs) with evidence
and help publicizing such infosec fame, attracting or
retaining customers increasingly concerned with privacy
and confidentiality.
3) The last and also the most important incentive for
organizations to take positive reaction is peer influence
through explicitly comparing each organization to oth-
ers. Social comparison theory, [57], indicates that pub-
licly comparing similar organizations can change their
behavior through peer pressure, [58] demonstrates that,
after controlling for an individual’s own income, higher
earnings of neighbors are associated with lower levels
self-reported happiness. This finding proves that individ-
uals care about their relative position in comparisons.
For organizations, we expect peer pressure to be more
prominent because similar businesses would compete
in the same market on the same group of customers,
[59]. Rankings derived from the data mobilized by
mandatory breach reporting would put peer pressure on
organizations to improve their infosec, and would also
make visible what kinds of exploits were successful so
white hat security personnel could fight them better.
SpamRankings.net focuses on outbound spam because that
data is readily available through anti-spam blocklists. If this
reputational approach proves out through experiment, applying
it to other data would be appropriate.
The Anti-Spam Working Group (APWG) collects a large
database of phishing reports and makes it available to re-
searchers. We are familiar [27] with that database’s problems
of coverage [60]. However, we have plans to produce two
sets of phishing organizational rankings (senders of phishing
message and hosters of phishing websites). We do not plan
to use those phishing rankings standalone, nor do we expect
them to completely measure phishing, anymore than we expect
our spam rankings to completely measure spam. Like for the
spam data, we expect the phishing data to provide indications.
We expect the phishing rankings to be especially useful in
comparison to the spam rankings, to observe how changes
in one symptom of poor infosec (spam) for organizations are
reflected in changes in another symptom (phishing). Spam-
ming botnets do not normally also send phishing messages,
so coordinated changes in phishing and spam rankings for an
organization would be evidence of changes in its underlying
infosec. Conversely, if an organization drops on one kind of
ranking (phishing or spam) but not on the other, it would
seem to still have an infosec problem. This is one way we can
determine how much changes in the spam rankings actually
indicate changes in underlying infosec.
Other available data sources include Dshield [61] and
the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [62]. Such data
sources also be used to calibrate the spam data, although their
utility is limited, because those datasets are not updated very
often and are not very comprehensive.
Governments or trade associations or stock markets could
require infosec problem disclosure publicly through the Inter-
net. Such data could enable more rankings for more incentives.
Traditional government, being slow and geographically or-
ganized, cannot handle the rapidly changing miscreant econ-
omy that fuels worldwide spam. Private parties alone have
clearly failed to do so. What is needed is the kind of multi-
level multi-organizational loose cooperation that studies of
governance of many types of commons indicate works [63].
The key feature is ”management by the users themselves,”
[64].
The reliability and security of the Internet, how-
ever, is a public good that cannot be ignored. The
security of the Internet is a public good because
availability to one user does not diminish its avail-
ability to another user.
...in large and complex systems, there should be
multiple layers of nested enterprises (p. 101 f ). In
the case of the Internet, individual users operate at a
low level, while organizations and user communities
operate at a middle level.
Contribution to the public good can be effectively encour-
aged by “rewards for those with a good reputation in the public
goods game” [65]. Rankings such as pioneered by Spam-
Rankings.net and studied with the experiments outlined in this
paper can provide information and incentive for stakeholders
to organize themselves to collectively manage the Internet
commons [63].
The importance of infosec is increasing as the entire world
becomes increasingly dependent on computers and networks
[66]. As Dr. Geer reminded us [67],
Attacking national infrastructures is also done with
computers – often hijacked computers. Thus, threats
to computing infrastructures are explicitly and inher-
ently risk harm to those very societies in proportion
to those society’s dependence on them.
The Pentagon now considers cyber attacks from a foreign
nation as an “act of war”, [68].
The policy implications of this work thus conceivably
extend to societal and national security.
E. Interpretation, unanswered questions, and future research
We can do multiple rankings as still more treatments (rank-
ings from 2+ blocklists, normalized by country population,
by Internet users per country; recidivism, resistance; monthly,
weekly, daily; etc.). Such multiple rankings could permit doing
multiple field trials using the same countries, since ASNs
would rank differently for each ranking, and some that didn’t
appear at all in one ranking might be at the top of another
ranking. See for example Microsoft appearing at the top of
the U.S. PSBL ranking, while not appearing at all ever in the
U.S. CBL ranking.
The multiple vaccines accounted for in the immunization
study [16] might be considered analogous to multiple rankings.
Conversely, those vaccines might be considered analogous
to different infosec applied by the ranked organizations, with
our treatments being publicization of rankings by infosec. We
have sketched out methods of distinguishing infosec so as to
determine which infosec works, perhaps even which infosec
works against which exploits.
IV. CONCLUSION
Reputation derived from publishing comparisons of infosec
symptoms apparently do cause changes in infosec of ranked
organizations. This project builds on promising pilot studies,
moving to systematic experiments with statistical examination.
If those more rigorous trials are successful, they will moti-
vate policy recommendations for further infosec disclosure,
enabling further reputational rankings and more improved
infosec.
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